Feminism is largely opposed to any simple or universal definition. In general, feminists take the experience of women seriously, as well as the impact of theories and practices on women`s lives. Given the pervasive influence of contract theory on social, political and moral philosophy, it is therefore not surprising that feminists have much to say about whether treaty theory is appropriate or appropriate from the point of view of women`s seriousness. To question all feminist responses to the theory of the social contract would take us far beyond the limits of this article. I will therefore focus only on three of these arguments: Carole Pateman`s reasoning on the relationship between the contract and the subordination of women between men, feminist arguments about the nature of the liberal individual and the argument of care. How the treaty theorist models the parties to the agreement depends on our (real) problem and what is relevant to its solution. A great gap between contemporary theories of the social contract is therefore to define the problem of justice. Interpretations of the fair problem are often distinguished between Hobbesians (“contractors”) and kantonic interpretations (“contractual”). These categories are imprecise and there are often as many differences within these two approaches as between them, but the distinction is nevertheless useful in isolating some key conflicts in contemporary social contract theory. Among these “contractuals” who can be called – basically – the followers of Hobbes, the difficult task of the decisive task is to solve, as Gauthier (1991, 16) says, the “fundamental crisis” of morality: Rawls, after arguing that any rational person who inhabits the original position and stands behind the veil of ignorance can discover the two principles of justice. It is very abstract, because instead of showing that we have signed, or even signed, a contract to found society, it shows us instead what we must accept as rational people in order to be limited by justice and thus be able to live in a well-ordered society. The principles of justice are more fundamental than the social contract, as it has traditionally been conceived.
On the contrary, the principles of justice limit this treaty and set the limits of how we can build society. If, for example, we consider a Constitution as a concrete expression of the social contract, rawls determines two legal principles that can and cannot be asked of us. Rawls` theory of justice therefore represents the canteen limits of the forms of political and social organization that are allowed in a just society. [The social contract] can be reduced to the following conditions: each of us pools our person and all his power under the supreme leadership of the general will; and in one body we receive each limb as an indivisible part of the whole.  The basic idea seems simple: in a way, the consent of all persons subject to collective social agreements shows that these rules have normative property (they are legitimate, just, mandatory, etc.). But even this basic idea is far from simple, and even this abstract presentation is offensive in many ways. In moral and political philosophy, the social contract is a theory or model that emerged during the Enlightenment and generally concerns the legitimacy of the state`s authority over the individual.  The arguments of the social contract typically mean that individuals have expressly or implicitly agreed to give up some of their freedoms and submit to the authority (of the sovereign or the decision of a majority) in exchange for the protection of their remaining rights or the maintenance of social order.
  The relationship between natural and legal rights is often a subject of social contract theory.